Dale Kaymark v. Bank of America NA by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-7-2015 
Dale Kaymark v. Bank of America NA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Dale Kaymark v. Bank of America NA" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 337. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/337 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 14-1816 
____________ 
 
DALE KAYMARK, individually and on behalf of 
other similarly situated current and former 
homeowners in Pennsylvania, 
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; UDREN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-13-cv-00419) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
______ 
 
Argued December 10, 2014 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 7, 2015) 
 2 
 
Jonathan R. Burns, Esq. 
Michael P. Malakoff, Esq.  ARGUED 
Malakoff, Doyle & Finberg 
437 Grant Street, Suite 200 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
  Counsel for Appellant Dale Kaymark 
Thomas L. Allen, Esq.  ARGUED 
Nellie E. Hestin, Esq. 
Reed Smith 
225 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1200 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
Marc A. Goldich, Esq. 
Andrew J. Soven, Esq. 
Reed Smith 
1717 Arch Street 
Three Logan Square, Suite 3100 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
  Counsel for Appellee Bank of America, N.A. 
Jonathan J. Bart, Esq.  ARGUED 
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer 
Two Penn Center Plaza 
Suite 910 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
  Counsel for Appellee Udren Law Offices, P.C. 
 
______ 
 
 3 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Dale Kaymark defaulted on a mortgage held by Bank 
of America, N.A. (“BOA”). On behalf of BOA, Udren Law 
Offices, P.C. (“Udren”) initiated foreclosure proceedings 
against Kaymark in state court.  The body of the Foreclosure 
Complaint listed certain not-yet-incurred fees as due and 
owing, which Kaymark alleges violated several state and 
federal fair debt collection laws and breached the mortgage 
contract.  Because we conclude that Kaymark has sufficiently 
pled that the disputed fees constituted actionable 
misrepresentation under the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., we will reverse the 
District Court’s order dismissing certain FDCPA claims 
against Udren but affirm its dismissal of all other claims. 
I. 
A. 
Kaymark refinanced his home in Coraopolis, 
Pennsylvania, in December 2006, executing a note for 
$245,600 and granting BOA a mortgage.  The mortgage was 
insured by Fannie Mae (“FNMA”).  The terms of the 
mortgage state, in pertinent part:  
Lender may charge Borrower fees for 
services performed in connection with 
Borrower’s default and for the purpose 
of protecting Lender’s interest in the 
Property and rights under this Security 
Agreement, including, but not limited to, 
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attorneys’ fees, property inspection and 
valuation fees. 
. . . . 
If the default is not cured as specified . . . 
. Lender shall be entitled to collect all 
expenses incurred in pursuing the 
remedies provided in this Section [], 
including, but not limited to, attorneys’ 
fees and costs of title evidence to the 
extent permitted by Applicable Law. 
App. 72a (¶ 14), 75a (¶ 22) (emphases added).  
Kaymark experienced a drop in income in June 2011 
and failed to make his mortgage payments.  On August 1, 
2011, BOA sent Kaymark an “Act 91 Notice” of pre-
foreclosure delinquency pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Housing 
Finance Agency Law, 35 P.S. § 1680.403c, which requires 
mortgage-holders considering foreclosure to send 
homeowners a notice as a prerequisite to initiating formal 
action.  An Act 91 notice must, among other things, include 
an itemized breakdown of the total amount past due as of the 
date of the notice and inform the homeowner that he is 
entitled to thirty days plus three additional days for mailing to 
meet with a consumer credit counseling agency to attempt to 
resolve the delinquency.  Id.  Kaymark alleges his Act 91 
Notice was improper by attempting to collect three months 
payment when, at the date of mailing, Kaymark was only two 
months in arrears, and by misrepresenting the time within 
which Kaymark had to meet with a credit agency as thirty 
days, instead of thirty-three days. 
Over a year later, on September 13, 2012, Udren, on 
behalf of BOA, filed a verified Foreclosure Complaint against 
Kaymark in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
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County, Pennsylvania.  The body of the Foreclosure 
Complaint included an itemized list of the total debt, stating 
that the following items were due and owing as of July 12, 
2012: 
 Unpaid Principal Balance   
 $213,224.26 
 Accumulated Interest (07/01/2011-07/12/2012)   
$13,452.47 
 Accumulated Late Charges           
$177.74 
 Escrow Deficit / (Reserve)        
$1,935.45 
 Title Report             
$325.00 
 Attorney Fees         
$1,650.00 
 Property Inspection                      
$75.00 
 Grand Total     
 $230,839.92 
 
The above figures are calculated as of 07/12/2012[.] 
App. 47a.   
Kaymark alleges that the $1,650 in attorneys’ fees, 
$325 in title report fees, and $75 in property inspection fees 
(or $2,050 total) were not actually incurred as of July 12, two 
months before the foreclosure action was filed on September 
13.  Kaymark also alleges that the fees were improperly 
calculated on a fixed basis.  Appellees retort that fixed fees 
are contemplated under the FNMA servicing guide, which 
sets the maximum foreclosure fee, or cap, for attorneys’ fees 
at $1,650.  See App. 85a-86a.   
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Kaymark contested the foreclosure action, which is 
still pending in the Allegheny County Court of Common 
Pleas.  As such, Kaymark has never paid the disputed fees.  
The parties do not dispute that these fees were ultimately 
incurred in the course of the foreclosure action or that the fees 
were ultimately reasonable.  See App. 6a n.4. 
B. 
 In February 2013, Kaymark filed a complaint on 
behalf of himself and a putative class against BOA and Udren 
(collectively, “Appellees”) in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Allegheny County.  In the original complaint, Kaymark 
alleged that Appellees violated the Pennsylvania Loan 
Interest and Protection Law (“Act 6”), 41 P.S. § 101 et seq., 
because the Foreclosure Complaint sought attorneys’ fees 
which were not “actually incurred” upon commencement of 
the foreclosure action.  Id. § 406.  Appellees removed the 
case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania and filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that 
Kaymark’s mortgage exceeded the maximum baseline figure 
to be governed under Act 6.   
 In response, Kaymark filed an amended complaint, 
asserting the following four counts on the bases of the alleged 
misrepresentations in the Foreclosure Complaint and/or Act 
91 Notice:  Count I, against BOA, for violating 
§ 2270.4(b)(5)(ii), (v), (x), and (6)(i) of the Pennsylvania Fair 
Credit Extension Uniformity Act (“FCEUA”), 73 P.S. § 
2270.1 et seq.; Count II, against Udren, for violating §§ 
1692e(2)(A), (5), (10), and 1692f(1) of the FDCPA; Count 
III, against both BOA and Udren, for violating the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq., by 
virtue of the violations of the FCEUA or by engaging in 
certain “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” in violation of 
 7 
§ 201-2(4)(v) and (xxi); and Count IV, against BOA, for 
common law breach of contract. 
 BOA and Udren again moved to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation 
(“R&R”) to grant the motions on December 11, 2013.  It 
reasoned that Kaymark’s FDCPA claim that Appellees were 
not authorized to list not-yet-incurred flat fees in the 
Foreclosure Complaint was “rather hypertechnical,” App. 
136a, and that “nowhere do the loan documents or any state 
or federal law prohibit listing attorneys’ fees and other fixed 
costs at the time of filing the complaint, but are reasonably 
expected to be incurred,” App. 135a.  It also explained that 
Kaymark “pled himself out of the state causes of action” 
because he did not show any actual loss or damage.  App. 
125a. 
 The District Court adopted the R&R and granted the 
motions to dismiss in their entirety, with prejudice, on March 
31, 2014.  Agreeing that the inclusion of not-yet-incurred fees 
was not prohibited by the mortgage contract or other state or 
federal laws, the District Court dismissed the FDCPA claim.  
It also concluded that Kaymark failed to demonstrate an 
actual loss as a result of the alleged misrepresentations, and, 
therefore, that he failed to state a claim under the UTPCPL 
and the FCEUA.  For the same reasons (i.e., failure to plead 
actual loss), the District Court dismissed Kaymark’s breach of 
contract claim against BOA.  Kaymark timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over 
Kaymark’s FDCPA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over Kaymark’s state-law claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  This Court exercises jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  See 
Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 
2012).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Id. (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We accept 
all factual allegations as true and construe all inferences in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Id.   
III. 
A. 
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 “to eliminate 
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692(e).  The Court has repeatedly held that “[a]s 
remedial legislation, the FDCPA must be broadly construed 
in order to give full effect to these purposes,” Caprio v. 
Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 
(3d Cir. 2013), and, as such, we analyze the communication 
giving rise to the FDCPA claim “from the perspective of the 
least sophisticated debtor,” Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 
F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Kaymark alleges that, by attempting to collect fees for 
legal services not yet performed in the mortgage foreclosure, 
Udren violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e—specifically, 
§ 1692e(2)(A), (5), and (10)—which imposes strict liability 
on debt collectors who “use any false, deceptive, or 
misleading representation or means in connection with the 
collection of any debt,” and § 1692f(1) by attempting to 
collect “an[] amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or 
expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such 
amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the 
debt or permitted by law.”  
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Bearing on these claims, the parties dispute the 
relevance of our intervening decision in McLaughlin v. 
Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 
2014)—decided by this Court after the District Court’s order.  
In McLaughlin, we held that nearly-indistinguishable conduct 
in a debt collection demand letter, rather than a foreclosure 
complaint, violated the FDCPA.  We now conclude that 
McLaughlin’s holding extends to foreclosure complaints, and 
we reverse the District Court’s order dismissing certain 
FDCPA claims against Udren.  
1. 
Timothy McLaughlin defaulted on a mortgage held by 
CitiMortgage. CitiMortgage referred the issue to Phelan 
Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP (“PHS”), which sent McLaughlin a 
demand letter on June 7, 2010, itemizing the total amount of 
debt due as of May 18, 2010, as $365,488.40.  Id. at 243.  The 
debt included two line items relevant here:  $650 in 
“Attorney’s Fees” and $550 for “Costs of Suit and Title 
Search.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Like in the 
case at bar, “McLaughlin assert[ed], among other things, that 
these fees and costs had not actually been incurred as of the 
date stated in the Letter,” id., constituting actionable 
misrepresentation under § 1692e(2) (“The false representation 
of—(A) the character, amount, of legal status of any debt; or 
(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be 
lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a 
debt.”) and (10) (“The use of any false representation or 
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to 
obtain information concerning a consumer.”) of the FDCPA.   
 When McLaughlin filed a class action complaint, the 
district court held, among other things, that “estimating the 
amount of attorneys’ fees in an itemized debt collection 
notice does not violate the FDCPA,” id. (internal quotation 
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marks omitted), and dismissed McLaughlin’s claims.  On 
appeal, this Court reversed: 
 Nothing [in the Letter] says [the amount 
owed on the debt] is an estimate or in 
any way suggests that it was not a 
precise amount. As the drafter of the 
Letter, PHS is responsible for its content 
and for what the least sophisticated 
debtor would have understood from it. If 
PHS wanted to convey that the amounts 
in the Letter were estimates, then it could 
have said so. It did not. Instead, its 
language informs the reader of the 
specific amounts due for specific items 
as of a particular date. If the amount 
actually owed as of that date was less 
than the amount listed, then, construing 
the facts in the light most favorable to 
McLaughlin as we must when reviewing 
the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), 
McLaughlin has stated a claim that the 
Letter misrepresents the amount of the 
debt in violation of § 1692e(2) and (10). 
Id. at 246 (internal citations omitted).   
 The facts in McLaughlin are virtually indistinguishable 
from the case at bar.  Here, the Foreclosure Complaint also 
plainly “inform[ed] the reader of the specific amounts due for 
specific items as of a particular date,” id., two months prior to 
the date the Foreclosure Complaint was filed.  Udren also did 
not convey that the disputed fees were estimates or imprecise 
amounts.  Thus, pursuant to McLaughlin, the Foreclosure 
Complaint conceivably misrepresented the amount of the debt 
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owed, forming a basis for violations of § 1692e(2)(A) and 
(10). 
By extension, it follows that Kaymark has sufficiently 
alleged that Udren’s attempt to collect those misrepresented 
fees was not “expressly authorized” by the mortgage contract 
or permitted by law.  § 1692f(1).1  To be sure, Kaymark 
expressly agreed to the collection of certain fee categories, 
such as “attorneys’ fees, property inspection and valuation 
fees.”  App. 72a (¶ 14).  But the contract also specified that 
BOA could only charge for “services performed in 
connection with” the default and collect “all expenses 
incurred” in pursuing authorized remedies.  App. 72a (¶ 14), 
75a (¶ 22) (emphases added).  While such language is 
arguably capable of more than one meaning, we must view 
the Foreclosure Complaint through the lens of the least-
sophisticated consumer and in the light most favorable to 
Kaymark.  In this perspective, the most natural reading is that 
Udren was not authorized to collect fees for not-yet-
performed legal services and expenses, forming a basis for a 
violation of §1692f(1).2  
This conclusion is not a departure from our sister 
Circuits, which have held that demanding fees in the 
collection of debts in a way contrary to the underlying 
agreement is actionable under the FDCPA.  See Kojetin v. C 
U Recovery, Inc., 212 F.3d 1318 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) 
                                              
1 The district court dismissed this claim in 
McLaughlin, and McLaughlin did not challenge it on appeal.  
See McLaughlin, 756 F.3d at 244 n.5.  
2 Because there is no such language for fixed fees, we 
will presume that they were not prohibited by the mortgage 
contract (or, in any event, intertwined with the argument that 
the fees be actually incurred). 
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(finding FDCPA violation where the debt collector charged a 
collection fee based on a percentage of the principal balance 
of the debt due rather than the “actual cost[]” of collection as 
stipulated in the loan agreement); Bradley v. Franklin 
Collection Serv., Inc., 739 F.3d 606, 610 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(finding § 1692f(1) violation where debtor “agreed to pay the 
actual costs of collection,” not “a percentage above the 
amount of his outstanding debt that was unrelated to the 
actual costs to collect that debt”) (per curiam).  Likewise, 
Kaymark agreed to pay attorneys’ fees and other expenses 
that were actually incurred in connection with the default, not 
fees that might eventually be incurred.  
However, because Udren did not “threat[en] to take 
an[] action that cannot legally be taken,” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692e(5), such as falsely threatening to file suit, see Brown 
v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 454-55 (3d Cir. 2006), 
Kaymark fails to state a claim under § 1692e(5).    
 The false communication in McLaughlin was a debt 
collection letter; here, of course, it is a Foreclosure 
Complaint.  Accordingly, to determine whether Kaymark has 
sufficiently stated an FDCPA claim, we must decide whether 
this distinction is fatal. 
2. 
The thrust of Udren’s argument is that pleadings—in 
particular, foreclosure complaints—cannot be the basis of 
FDCPA claims.  However, the statutory text, as well at the 
case law interpreting the text, renders this argument meritless.  
 In Heintz v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court established 
that attorneys “engage[d] in consumer-debt-collection 
activity, even when that activity consists of litigation” are 
covered by the FDCPA.  514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995).  In so 
holding, the Court explained that Congress repealed an 
express exemption from the definition of “debt collector” in 
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an earlier version of the statute for “any attorney-at-law 
collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name 
of a client.”  Id. at 294 (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-109, 
§ 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874, 875 (1977)).  Once Congress 
amended the law without creating another exemption to fill its 
void, the Court explained, “Congress intended that lawyers be 
subject to the [FDCPA] whenever they meet the general ‘debt 
collector’ definition.”  Id. at 295; see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 
(defining debt collector as “any person . . . who regularly 
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts 
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”).  That 
the FDCPA covers attorneys engaged in debt collection 
litigation is well-established law in this Circuit, see, e.g., 
Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 234 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (“[I]f a communication meets the [FDCPA’s] 
definition of an effort by a ‘debt collector’ to collect a ‘debt’ 
from a ‘consumer,’ it is not relevant that it came in the 
context of litigation.”), and there is no dispute here that Udren 
acted as a “debt collector” when, by filing the Foreclosure 
Complaint, it “attempt[ed] to collect” a debt on behalf of 
BOA.  15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 
But Congress did not stop there.  Subsequent to Heintz, 
Congress twice amended the statute and exempted “formal 
pleading[s] made in connection with a legal action” from 15 
U.S.C. § 1692e(11), as amended Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 2305(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-425 (1996), and 
“communication[s] in the form of [] formal pleading[s]” from 
§ 1692g(d), as amended Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(a), 120 
Stat. 1966 (2006), two provisions not here at issue.  If 
Congress intended that all conduct in the course of formal 
pleadings be exempt from the FDCPA, then these express 
exemptions would be superfluous, and “courts should 
disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language 
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superfluous.”  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 
253 (1992).  Furthermore, as the Fourth Circuit explained, 
“the fact that the amendment[s] occurred after Heintz further 
indicates that Congress was aware of the Court’s 
interpretation of the FDCPA and accepted it, except for the 
narrow exemption[s] it provided for formal pleadings” in 
§§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d).  Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 
485 F.3d 226, 231 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382 
n.66 (1982) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of a[] . . . 
judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that 
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  If Congress had wanted 
to exclude formal pleadings from the protections of the 
FDCPA under any of its other provisions, it could have done 
so.  It did not.  Thus, except for §§ 1692e(11) and 1692g(d), 
“[t]he amendment[s] by [their] terms in fact suggest[] that all 
litigation activities, including formal pleadings, are subject to 
the FDCPA.”  Sayyed, 485 F.3d at 231.   
We conclude that a communication cannot be uniquely 
exempted from the FDCPA because it is a formal pleading or, 
in particular, a complaint.  This principle is widely accepted 
by our sister Circuits.  See, e.g., Currier v. First Resolution 
Inv. Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The fact that 
the [alleged violation] appears in a lawsuit or other court 
filing does not diminish the threatening nature of the 
communication for purposes of the FDCPA.”); James v. 
Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
FDCPA ‘applies to the litigating activities of lawyers,’ which, 
as other circuits have held, may include the service upon a 
debtor of a complaint to facilitate debt collection efforts . . . 
.”) (quoting Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294)); Donohue v. Quick 
Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To limit 
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the litigation activities that may form the basis of FDCPA 
liability to exclude complaints served personally on 
consumers to facilitate debt collection, the very act that 
formally commences such a litigation, would require a 
nonsensical narrowing of the common understanding of the 
word ‘litigation’ that we decline to adopt.”); Sayyed, 485 F.3d 
at 229 (subjecting interrogatories and summary judgment 
motions to the FDCPA); Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp., 
233 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding § 1692e(2) and 
(10) violations where debt collector’s “allegation in its state 
court complaint . . . gave a false impression as to the legal 
status it enjoyed”).  And, while we have not directly decided 
the issue, this Court has extended the FDCPA to state court 
complaints, see Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 152 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (explaining that the law firm, “[i]n filing the 
Foreclosure Complaint against Glover,” indisputably met the 
definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA), and so has 
the Supreme Court, see Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, 
Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010) (deciding the 
scope of the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense on the basis of 
a notice attached to mortgage foreclosure complaint). 
Udren makes two further attempts to distinguish 
foreclosure complaints from debt collection letters, both of 
which must fail.  
 First, Udren contends that a complaint, because it is 
directed to the court, is not a communication to the consumer 
subject to §§ 1692e and 1692f.  This argument cannot be 
sustained.  The statute defines a “communication” under the 
FDCPA as “the conveying of information regarding a debt 
directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (emphasis added).  Interpreting this 
provision in Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., where 
we decided whether a communication made to a consumer’s 
 16 
attorney was governed by § 1692f, we held that “[i]f an 
otherwise improper communication would escape FDCPA 
liability simply because that communication was directed to a 
consumer’s attorney, it would undermine the deterrent effect 
of strict liability.”  629 F.3d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 
id. at n.6 (noting that the Heintz Court also referred to a 
communication from a debt collector to a consumer’s 
attorney, though it did not directly decide that question).   
So too for pleadings filed with the court and served on 
the consumer.  Because the Foreclosure Complaint was 
served on Kaymark (directly or indirectly through his 
attorney), he was the intended recipient of the 
communication.  See Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1031-32 (holding 
that a complaint served on the debtor is a communication 
subject to the FDCPA).3  Courts have only held that a 
                                              
3 Moreover, rejecting similar arguments that Udren raised in 
this case, the Ninth Circuit explained:   
[Defendant] Quick Collect suggests that 
a complaint, because it can be corrected 
by amending the offending pleading, 
should not constitute an actionable 
communication. But all communications 
can be “amended” in this way by simply 
sending out a subsequent communication 
correcting the error. Sections 1692e and 
1692f do not suggest that otherwise 
unlawful representations are permitted so 
long as they are followed up, at some 
later time, with a communication 
correcting the statements that gave rise to 
the communication's unlawful nature. 
We see no reason to treat complaints 
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complaint misleads the judge, rather than the consumer, 
when, for instance, the plaintiff specifically pled that a 
materially-false attachment to a complaint “would mislead the 
Cook County judge handling his case.”  O’Rourke v. 
Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 
2011); see id. at 939 (noting that this allegation was “[u]nlike 
most lawsuits under the [FDCPA]”).  This is not that case.  
Here, the Foreclosure Complaint was unquestionably a 
communication directed at Kaymark in attempt to collect on 
his debt.  
 Udren’s second argument is that foreclosure actions 
cannot be the basis of FDCPA claims because Kaymark has 
to his avail the protections of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure and because the Heintz Court noted that the 
FDCPA has the “apparent objective of preserving creditors’ 
judicial remedies.”  514 U.S. at 296.  
Similar arguments have been raised and rejected.  In 
Simon v. FIA Card Services, N.A., we refused to categorically 
preclude FDCPA claims because the claim arose in a pending 
bankruptcy proceeding, referencing the Supreme Court’s 
“reluctan[ce] to limit the FDCPA because other, preexisting 
rules and remedies may also apply to the conduct alleged to 
violate the [FDCPA].”  732 F.3d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 2013).  We 
explained that “[t]he proper inquiry . . . is whether the 
FDCPA claim raises a direct conflict between the 
                                                                                                     
differently where there was no effort to 
correct the error before an answer was 
filed. 
 
Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1032 n.1.  We agree that simply 
because a complaint is amendable is not a justification for 
removing it from the protections of the FDCPA. 
 18 
[Bankruptcy] Code or Rules and the FDCPA, or whether both 
can be enforced.”  Id. at 274; see also Germain, 503 U.S. at 
253 (“Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in 
drafting, and so long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy’ 
between two laws, a court must give effect to both.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
Nowhere does the FDCPA exclude foreclosure actions 
from its reach.  On the contrary, foreclosure meets the broad 
definition of “debt collection” under the FDCPA, see 
McLaughlin, 756 F.3d at 245 (defining “debt collection” as 
“activity undertaken for the general purpose of inducing 
payment”), and it is even contemplated in various places in 
the statute, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692i (discussing procedures 
for “action[s] to enforce an interest in real property securing 
the consumer’s obligation”); Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 
704 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining why 
“[f]oreclosure’s legal nature . . . does not prevent it from 
being debt collection”).  Udren would have us “create an 
enormous loophole in the [FDCPA] [by] immunizing any 
debt from coverage if that debt happened to be secured by a 
real property interest and foreclosure proceedings were used 
to collect the debt.”  Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P.L.L.C., 
443 F.3d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 2006).  We will not.  Like the 
Court explained previously, “if a collector were able to avoid 
liability under the FDCPA simply by choosing to proceed in 
rem rather than in personam, it would undermine the purpose 
of the FDCPA.”  Piper, 396 F.3d at 236 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
In any event, the prudence of maintaining parallel 
FDCPA claims is not ours to decide; it is Congress’s, and its 
intent is clear for the reasons discussed.  Absent a finding that 
“the result [will be] so absurd as to warrant implying an 
exemption for” FDCPA claims involving foreclosure actions, 
 19 
we are not empowered to disregard the plain language of the 
statute.  Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295.  Thus, Udren’s arguments 
are more “properly addressed to Congress,” which “is, of 
course, free to amend the statute accordingly.”  Jerman, 559 
U.S. at 604. 
Given our holding in McLaughlin based on nearly-
indistinguishable facts, we conclude that the fact that the debt 
collection activity at issue here involves a foreclosure 
complaint, rather than a debt collection letter, does not 
remove it from the FDCPA’s purview under McLaughlin.  
We will reverse the order dismissing Kaymark’s 
§§ 1692e(2)(A), (10), and 1692f(1) claims against Udren, and 
we will affirm the order dismissing the § 1692e(5) claim. 
B. 
Kaymark next alleges that, by misrepresenting or 
overcharging fees in the Foreclosure Complaint, BOA and 
Udren4 violated the UTPCPL by virtue of the violations of the 
FCEUA, 73 P.S. § 2270.5(a) (“If a debt collector or creditor 
engages in an unfair or deceptive debt collection act or 
practice under [the FCEUA], it shall constitute a violation of 
the [UTPCPL].”), or by engaging in certain “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices,” in violation of 73 P.S. § 201-
                                              
4 While Udren is correct that attorneys are exempt 
from liability under the UTPCPL if the alleged misconduct 
concerns the adequacy of their legal representation, attorneys 
engaged in debt collection—considered an “act of trade or 
commerce” within the definition of the UTPCPL—are not.  
See Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1088-89, 1093 (Pa. 
2007) (plurality); Yelin v. Swartz, 790 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337-
38 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  Because the parties do not dispute that 
Udren’s alleged misconduct here stems from its debt 
collection activities, we do not immunize it from liability.  
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2(4)(v) (representing that services have characteristics they do 
not have) and (xxi) (“Engaging in any other fraudulent or 
deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or 
of misunderstanding.”).   
To maintain a private right of action under the 
UTPCPL, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) “ascertainable loss 
of money or property, real or personal,” id. § 201-9.2(a), (2) 
“as a result of” the defendant’s prohibited conduct under the 
statute, id.; see Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 
A.2d 425, 438 (Pa. 2004).  Assuming arguendo that Kaymark 
has pled a violation of the UTPCPL, we conclude that 
Kaymark fails to allege ascertainable loss, and we do not 
reach Appellees’ alternative argument that Kaymark also 
failed to establish reliance.   
The crux of Kaymark’s theory of ascertainable loss is 
that the “lien” on his property from the mortgage was inflated 
by not-yet-performed services, “resulting in a corresponding, 
precisely quantifiable, diminishment in his interests in 
property.”  Appellant’s Br. at 38.  He reasons that, for a 
period of time before any services were performed, he had to 
pay $2,050 extra—the total overcharged amount on the 
debt—to cure his default and avoid foreclosure.  The District 
Court rejected Kaymark’s so-called “lien” theory, concluding 
that his “argument is couched in forward-looking speculative 
terms.”  App. 5a.  On the facts presented in this case, we 
agree.  
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not 
definitively addressed what constitutes ascertainable loss 
under the statute, “we must predict how that court would rule 
if faced with the issue,” and, in doing so, “[t]he decision of an 
intermediate state court is particularly relevant.”  Covington 
v. Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Lower state courts reason that “[a]scertainable loss must be 
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established from the factual circumstances surrounding each 
case,” Agliori v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 315, 321 (Pa. 
Super. 2005), but that the loss must be non-speculative, 
Schwarzwaelder v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. Super. 2006); 
see also Benner v. Bank of America, N.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 
338, 360 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“[A]n actual loss of money or 
property must have occurred to state a cognizable UTPCPL 
claim.”).  Based on the plain language of the statute, we find 
this interpretation persuasive. 
The statute explicitly provides that any person who 
suffers an ascertainable loss “may bring a private action to 
recover actual damages.”  73 P.S. § 201-9.2 (emphasis 
added).  Indeed, a plaintiff must have “suffered harm” as a 
result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.  Yocca, 854 A.2d 
at 438.  Kaymark’s “lien” theory is untenable because he has 
not suffered actual loss.  He alleges, in essence, that the 
alleged misrepresentations in the Foreclosure Complaint 
deprived him of his property to the extent of the 
misrepresentations.  However, Kaymark was never deprived 
of his property and never paid the disputed fees alleged to 
have deprived him of his property.  He very well could have, 
and did, contest the foreclosure action, which is still pending 
in state court.  And despite Kaymark’s ability to quantify the 
damages by the inverse of the allegedly inflated fees, “[t]he 
test of whether damages are remote or speculative has nothing 
to do with the difficulty in calculating the amount, but deals 
with the more basic question of whether there are identifiable 
damages. . . . Thus, damages are speculative only if the 
uncertainty concerns the fact of damages rather than the 
amount.”  Pashak v. Barish, 450 A.2d 67, 69 (Pa. Super. 
1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Of course, the statute references “ascertainable loss of 
money or property, real or personal,” 73 P.S. § 201-9.2 
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(emphasis added), and there may be situations in which a lien 
against a consumer’s property provides a sufficiently concrete 
loss that a consumer need not pay off before bringing a 
UTPCPL claim to remedy her rights.  See Brock v. Thomas, 
782 F. Supp. 2d 133, 143-44 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (denying motion 
to dismiss UTPCPL claim where equity theft scheme left 
victim’s home encumbered by lien).  However, losses can 
range from the speculative to the concrete, and, here, whether 
Kaymark would have cured his debt but for those fees is by 
definition speculative.  It is plausible that the alleged 
misrepresentations deterred Kaymark or other homeowners 
from curing their delinquencies—even if only on a temporary 
basis and even if that amount was negligible compared to the 
total debt.  But a plaintiff must experience some non-
speculative loss to make that harm actionable under the 
UTPCPL.  Cf. Schwarzwaelder, 895 A.2d at 619 (dismissing 
plaintiffs’ argument under the UTPCPL that they “would 
have” benefited from renegotiating their agent’s commission 
if they had known all the facts as “wholly speculative”).  
Kaymark’s temporary injury, which by all accounts shrank to 
zero after the filing of the foreclosure action, is too 
speculative, standing alone, to quality for the protection of the 
UTPCPL. 
The recent decision by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania interpreting the case law on a closely-related 
issue lends further support to this conclusion.  In Grimes v. 
Enterprise Leasing Co., LLC, 105 A.3d 1188 (Pa. 2014), a 
plaintiff brought, among other things, a UTPCPL claim 
against the Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia 
(“Enterprise”) for seeking allegedly fraudulent and excessive 
fees that, like here, she did not pay.  The Superior Court held 
that the plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss by incurring 
costs to retain an attorney to prevent Enterprise from 
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collecting the debt.  Enterprise argued on appeal that, if the 
Superior Court was correct, any plaintiff could show 
ascertainable loss by merely hiring a lawyer “without actually 
suffering a loss of money or property.”  Id. at 1192.  The 
Supreme Court agreed with Enterprise for two primary 
reasons.  First, it did not want to allow a plaintiff to 
“manufacture the ‘ascertainable loss’ required to bring a 
private UTPCPL claim simply by obtaining counsel.”  Id. at 
1193.  Second, confirming our analysis above, it 
distinguished the case law on which the Superior Court relied 
because “[i]n [those] cases, the plaintiff had alleged a specific 
loss of money.”  Id. at 1194 (emphasis added).5   
Because Kaymark has not adequately pled 
ascertainable loss from the fees he did not pay and currently 
disputes, his claim fails.  We therefore affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing the UTPCPL claim against BOA 
and Udren.  
C. 
The FCEUA, Pennsylvania’s analogue to the FDCPA, 
prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices with regard to the collection of 
debts.”  73 P.S. § 2270.2.  Kaymark alleges that by 
misrepresenting the amount of the debt in the Foreclosure 
Complaint and Act 91 Notice, BOA violated several FCEUA 
                                              
5 While the court also noted that the plaintiff did not 
allege ascertainable loss from the “unpaid bill, standing 
alone,” Grimes, 105 A.3d at 1193, we find Grimes instructive 
for determining ascertainable loss here.  The thrust of the 
opinion reads that because the plaintiff did not pay the 
disputed fees and therefore could not plead ascertainable loss, 
she cannot manufacture that loss with attorneys’ fees.  See id. 
at 1193-94. 
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provisions, which are identical to the FDCPA violations 
asserted.  Compare id. § 2270.4(b)(5)(ii), (v), (x), and (6)(i), 
with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), (5), (10), and 1692f(1). 
The text of the FCEUA’s enforcement provision reads:  
“If a debt collector or creditor engages in an unfair or 
deceptive debt collection act or practice under this act, it shall 
constitute a violation of the [UTPCPL].”  73 P.S. § 2270.5(a).  
The FCEUA therefore does not provide its own private cause 
of action; rather, it is enforced through the remedial provision 
of the UTPCPL.  While the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
has not ruled on its interpretation of § 2270.5(a), a Superior 
Court construing the statute recently concluded that “[t]he 
inclusion of a violation of the FCEUA as also being a 
violation of the UTPCPL[] evinces a clear intent by our 
Legislature that FCEUA claims be treated in the same manner 
as other private action claims under the UTPCPL. . . . 
FECUA [sic] claims therefore must plead that a plaintiff 
suffered an ascertainable loss as a result of a defendant’s 
prohibited action.”  Kern v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., No. 
2843 EDA 2013, 2015 WL 344623, at *5 (Pa. Super. Jan. 28, 
2015) (citing 1 P.S. § 1932); see also Benner, 917 F. Supp. 2d 
at 360 (holding that plaintiff’s FCEUA claim, “as brought 
under the UTPCPL,” failed because he did not show 
ascertainable loss).6  We find this interpretation persuasive 
and, indeed, logical.  If the FCEUA can only be enforced to 
the extent the UTPCPL’s private remedy is invoked, then it 
follows that Kaymark cannot state a claim for relief under the 
                                              
6 Where the state’s highest court has not definitively 
ruled on an issue, we consider the decisions of the state’s 
intermediate appellate courts.  See Covington, 381 F.3d at 
218.  
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FCEUA if he cannot state a claim for relief under the 
UTPCPL.  
As discussed, Kaymark failed to allege ascertainable 
loss because he cannot point to actual damages as a result of 
the disputed fees listed in the Foreclosure Complaint.  Much 
less can the alleged deficiencies in the pre-foreclosure Act 91 
Notice—the purpose of which is to provide debtors with 
information about programs to support them in their debt—
form the basis of any such loss.7  Therefore, we affirm the 
District Court’s order dismissing Kaymark’s FCEUA claim 
against BOA. 
D. 
Finally, we affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
Kaymark’s breach of contract claim against BOA for failure 
to plead resultant damages.  To allege breach of contract in 
Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must show “(1) the existence of a 
contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty 
imposed by the contract and (3) resultant damages.”  Omicron 
Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d 554, 564 (Pa. Super. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Kaymark relies on the same arguments asserted in his 
UTPCPL and FCEUA claims to show damages in his breach 
of contract claim.  Specifically, he alleges the unincurred, 
fixed fees in the Foreclosure Complaint diminished his 
property interests in his home.  Importing here the same 
reasons for rejecting those claims above, we conclude that 
Kaymark fails to plead resultant damages because he did not 
                                              
7 We do not reach BOA’s argument that an Act 91 
Notice can never be the basis of an FCEUA violation.  We 
hold, simply, that Kaymark fails to allege ascertainable loss 
on the basis of the Act 91 Notice in this case. 
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incur any non-speculative loss of property or pay the disputed 
fees or expenses.  As such, we affirm the District Court’s 
order dismissing Kaymark’s breach of contract claim and do 
not reach BOA’s alternative argument that Kaymark failed to 
plead breach of duty.  
 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
District Court’s order dismissing Kaymark’s 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1692e(A)(2), (10), and 1692f(1) claims against Udren and 
affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Kaymark’s 
§ 1692e(5), UTPCPL, FCEUA, and breach of contract claims. 
 
